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W. MATTHEWS GRANT ON HUMAN FREE WILL,
AND DIVINE UNIVERSAL CAUSATION
P. Roger Turner and Jordan Wessling

In recent work, W. Matthews Grant challenges the common assumption that if
humans have libertarian free will, and the moral responsibility it affords, then
it is impossible for God to cause what humans freely do. He does this by offering a “non-competitivist” model that he calls the “Dual Sources” account of
divine and human causation. Although we find Grant’s Dual Sources model
to be the most compelling of models on offer for non-competitivism, we argue
that it fails to circumvent a theological version of Peter van Inwagen’s direct
argument for incompatibilism. In the paper, we motivate and deploy a theological take on the direct argument, and we contend that this theological
rendition of the direct argument effectively dismantles Grant’s Dual Sources
account of non-competitivism.

I. Introduction
In recent work, W. Matthews Grant draws from broadly Thomistic and
scholastic resources and motivations to challenge the common assumption that if humans have libertarian free will, then it is logically impossible for God to cause what humans freely do.1 Grant does so by offering
a model that he calls the “Dual Sources” account of divine and human
causation. This model is just one account of what is sometimes called
“non-competitivism” about divine and human action, a framework that is
defended by a number of Christian philosophers and theologians.2 Noncompetitivism is, roughly, the idea that divine transcendence ensures that
God’s causing of an intentional human action could never in principle
“compete” with that human’s responsibility for it. A supposed implication of non-competitivism is that God can cause each human action without compromising significant human freedom and corresponding moral
responsibility, including libertarian freedom and the moral responsibility
1
See his Free Will and God’s Universal Causality; his “Divine Universal Causality Without
Occasionalism (and with Agent Causation)”; his “Divine Universal Causality and Libertarian
Freedom”; and his “Can a Libertarian Hold that our Free Acts are Caused by God?”
2
See, e.g., Burrell, “Human Freedom in the Context of Creation”; McCabe, “Freedom”;
Tanner, God and Creation in Theology.
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derived therefrom. Although Grant’s Dual Sources model provides just
one account of how non-competitivism could work, we find it to be the
most compelling of models on offer for such a non-competitivist view.
Even so, we argue that Grant’s Dual Sources model of non-competitivism fails to circumvent a theological version of Peter van Inwagen’s direct
argument for incompatibilism. Here, we present a formulation of a theological take on the direct argument, and we contend that, given the validity of two inference rules to be discussed, this theological rendition of the
direct argument effectively dismantles Grant’s Dual Sources account of
non-competitivism.
II. Understanding Grant’s Dual Sources Account
Grant affirms two doctrines which seem to contradict one another. On the
one hand, Grant affirms what he terms the “doctrine of divine universal
causality” (hereafter, DUC), according to which “God is the source and
cause” of all human beings and each of their actions. On the other hand,
Grant affirms that such universal causality does not compromise human
libertarian freedom, nor the responsibility derived therefrom.3 Hence
Grant assures us that we can have “a traditional view of God’s sovereignty,”4 which he appears to understand in terms of a meticulous providence where God gets all the details he wants within creation,5 without
thereby compromising “the sort of robust libertarian freedom that many
contemporary theists have wanted to endorse.”6 To make his case, Grant
distinguishes two models of divine action and contends that his preferred
model enables him to avoid placing DUC in competition with human
actions that are free in the libertarian sense.
Both of the models of divine action that Grant proposes conceptually
begin with a fairly standard understanding of intentional human action
which springs from an individual that enjoys the kind of freedom referred
to by defenders of agent causal libertarianism. To obtain a basic grasp of
the structure of the relevant kind of intentional action, consider a situation
wherein some human freely pushes the power button on the television
remote control for the purpose of turning on the television (and this for
the purpose of checking the score of “the game,” let us say). According
to the form of action at issue, when this human performs the act of pushing the power button on the remote, she does so by way of immediately
3

Grant, “Can a Libertarian Hold that our Free Acts are Caused by God?,” 22.
Grant, “Divine Universal Causality and Libertarian Freedom,” 214.
5
See, e.g., Grant’s “Can a Libertarian Hold that our Free Acts are Caused by God?,” 44,
as well as his, “Divine Universal Causality and Libertarian Freedom,” 214–215. However, if
Grant does not have the goal of ensuring a doctrine of meticulous providence, then much of
our criticism of Grant’s proposal is beside the point. Nevertheless, many non-competitivists
do maintain that something like DUC ensures that God is able to superintend and determine
all the details within creation without this comprising human responsibility and freedom.
See Matava for a list of such individuals (Divine Causality and Human Free Choice, 278–281).
6
Grant, “Divine Universal Causality and Libertarian Freedom,” 215.
4
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forming an intention—the content of which is acting to push the power
button on the remote for the sake of turning on the television—and that
intention produces the action/effect of applying pressure to the power
button on the television remote. On this way of thinking, there is no intermediate agential state (i.e., act or cause) that stands between the human
agent and the intention she causes; the agent, in other words, does not
cause her intention by performing some more basic or antecedent action.7
Nevertheless, in the human’s case, the agent’s causing of an intention does
intrinsically modify or change the agent, in that the agent acquires a mental state (i.e., the intention) that she did not have previously. So, on this
schema, a human’s successful completion of an intentional act includes
the following four parts: (i) the agent, (ii) the agent’s intention to act for
some reason or another, (iii) the effect of the agent’s intention, and (iv)
the resulting cause-effect relation that obtains between the agent and the
agent’s effect. To be sure, the defender of agent causal libertarianism will
want to say that much more is involved than these four parts in an action
that is free and for which the relevant individual is responsible (e.g., indeterminism, contra-causal capability of the agent, and the agent being the
ultimate source of the relevant action). Grant is aware of this and treats
such conditions. However, the noted four parts of the schema constitute
that which is most relevant for Grant’s argument for non-competitive
divine and human action.
With this basic account of intentional human action in place, Grant
applies the schema to divine action. He gives the resulting account of
divine action the label, “the popular model,” since it is just one apparently
popular or implicitly common token account of a broader class of accounts
he dubs “intrinsic models.”8 Intrinsic models are those models which cast
divine action as that which involves the formation of an intention, or some
other such feature, as that which is intrinsic to God. According to the popular model, the following parts are involved when God brings about some
creaturely effect E.
(a) God.
(b) E.
(c) God’s choice, decree, or intention to bring about E, which is intrinsic to
God, is that in virtue of which God causes E and which would not exist were
God not causing E.
(d) The casual-dependence relation between God and E.9

7
Perhaps the most prominent defender of a kind of agent causal libertarianism that runs
along such lines is Timothy O’Connor—see his Persons and Causes.
8
Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality, 56.
9
Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality. However, in “Divine Universal Causality
and Libertarian Freedom,” Grant presents a similar, but slightly different version of an
intrinsic model. See pp. 219ff for a discussion of that version of the model.
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If the popular model is true, Grant acknowledges that God’s causing of E
precludes the human from freely causing E in the libertarian sense.
The reason for this incompatibility is straightforward. According to
many libertarians, an act is free in the libertarian sense only if its agent
performs that act voluntarily and intentionally, and either that act is not
determined (i.e., there is no factor which is jointly prior to and logically
sufficient for the act), or the act is determined and the agent’s responsibility for the act is derived from that agent’s performance of some prior voluntary and intentional free act that was not itself determined.10 However,
if the popular model of divine agency is true, it looks like E is determined
in the relevant responsibility-precluding sense. For, given (c), there is some
real, intrinsic property, feature, or state of God in virtue of which God
causes E. Given that this feature or state of God is either his choice, decree,
intention, or etc., it seems inescapable that this state will be both prior to E,
in the sense of logical or explanatory priority, and logically sufficient for E,
in that, given omnipotence, this divine decree, or choice, or etc. entails that
E occurs. Consequently, when E concerns some intentional human action,
God’s causing of E by way of (c) determines E, which thereby precludes
the human from freely bringing about E in the libertarian sense—assuming, of course, that God’s causing of E precludes the human from being
responsible for the determined E by way of her performance of some prior
voluntary and intentional free act that was not itself determined.
Although Grant believes that the intrinsic model is currently popular
among theologians and philosophers,11 he maintains that it is not the only
viable way of conceiving of God’s action. Indeed, if God is perfectly simple (as characterized by the likes of St. Thomas Aquinas, for example),
God is not the type of being that forms anything like contingent internal
intentions to bring about various effects, as human agents do.12 Thus, a
simple God does not undergo that which is referred to by (c) in the popular model. Because of this, Grant has us consider another model of divine
action, that which he labels the “extrinsic model.” This model shares all
the same parts with the popular model, only with two exceptions. The
first exception is that (c) plays no role in the extrinsic model. The second
exception is that Grant adds a few more items than appear in the popular
model. Taken altogether, the extrinsic model characterizes God’s bringing
about of some creaturely effect E as follows:
(a) God.
(b) E.
(d) God’s reason for causing E.

10
With slight modification, this is Grant’s characterization of “the broad account” of libertarian freedom (“Divine Universal Causality and Libertarian Freedom”, 218).
11
Hence his having named it the “popular model.” See, e.g., Grant, Free Will and God’s
Universal Causality, 56.
12
See, e.g., Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality, 56–58, 76–79.
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(e) The cause-dependence relation between God and E.
(f) God’s causal act, or causing of E, which consists in E plus the causal relation between God and E.
(g) God’s willing or choosing E, which is nothing else than God’s causing E
for a reason when God could have done otherwise.13

There is much that could be said about the extrinsic model.14 For a basic
grasp of the model, however, perhaps it will suffice to draw a comparison
between it and the previous description of intentional human action as
understood by the agent causal libertarian.
Recall that according to the provided analysis of agent causal libertarianism, a human is said to be able to cause her intention immediately, not
by way of antecedent internal states, and this intention is thought to cause
the relevant effect (e.g., the application of pressure to the power button
on the television remote). The defender of the extrinsic model holds to
this basic schema in the divine case, only she claims that, instead of God
causing his intention immediately, God causes the effect immediately (say,
E). Hence God need not form the kind of intention that would be thought
of along the lines of (c) in the popular intrinsic model.
Grant contends that the removal of (c), within the extrinsic model,
allows for the compatibility of God causing a human act and yet that act
being a free human action in the libertarian sense. The reason for this
is that
[G]iven [the extrinsic model], none of the items on the scene when God
causes [E] constitutes a factor both prior to and logically sufficient for [E].
But, then, on [the extrinsic model], God’s causing [E] does not render [E]
determined. What goes for [E] goes for any creaturely act. Given [the extrinsic model], God can cause all creaturly acts without rendering any of them
determined. Thus, on [the extrinsic model], the only way a creaturely act
caused by God would be prevented from being free in the libertarian sense
is if God’s causing such an act precluded its creaturely agent’s performing
the act voluntarily and intentionally.15

In other words, without (c) there is no factor that removes a human’s act
being done voluntarily or intentionally. This is for two reasons. First, this
is because neither God (i.e., (a)) nor his reasons for acting (i.e., (d)) are logically sufficient for the relevant effect’s occurrence (i.e., the creature’s act),
since God is free to choose to bring about that effect or not. Second, this
is because neither the effect produced by God (i.e., (b)) nor the resulting
relation between God and the effect (i.e., (e)) are prior to the effect, even if
they are logically sufficient for it (i.e., although the occurrence of the effect
and God’s resulting relation to the effect individually entail that the effect
13

Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality, 60.
For a discussion see the following: Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity”; Grant, “Must a
Cause Be Really Related to Its Effect?”; O’Connor, “Simplicity and Creation”; and Pruss, “On
Two Problems of Divine Simplicity.”
15
Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality, 61.
14
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transpires, both of these entailments are logically simultaneous with, if not
subsequent to, the occurrence of the effect). Rather, as Grant conceives of
things on his extrinsic model, God’s causing of a human action is not prior
to this human action but simultaneous with it: “The co-operation between
God and the creaturely agent is one which neither God’s act nor the creature’s act can be causally or temporally prior to the other. [. . .] God’s act
and the creature’s act are simultaneous (or concurrent) necessary conditions
for each other.”16 Hence, a human act has dual sources. This is Grant’s Dual
Sources account, which allegedly pairs free libertarian human action, and
the moral responsibility it affords, with DUC.17
Grant’s defense of the compatibility of human libertarian responsibility with DUC is both more subtle and comprehensive than the present
treatment captures. Nevertheless, we maintain that Grant’s argument for
non-competitive divine and human action rests upon a mistaken emphasis on (c). More specifically, while Grant is correct that causing a human
action by way of that which is referred to by (c) precludes the human from
performing that act freely in the libertarian sense, Grant fails to recognize the way in which God’s causing of an action in accordance with the
Dual Sources account, his preferred extrinsic model, can likewise preclude
the exercise of libertarian freedom, or at least moral responsibility, among
(mere) humans. This is because Grant’s Dual Sources account apparently
falls prey to a theological version of the much discussed direct argument.
III. The Direct Argument Against Grant’s Non-Competitivism
The Direct Argument
Before we can argue that there is a version of the direct argument that
implies that Grant’s extrinsic model of divine action precludes humans
from being morally responsible, we must first summarize the original version of the direct argument, developed by Peter van Inwagen in his influential An Essay on Free Will. In this version, the contention is that human
moral responsibility is incompatible with (terrestrial) causal determinism—the thesis that at any instant there is exactly one physically possible future. Informally put, the direct argument goes as follows (where the
responsibility at issue refers to moral responsibility):

16
See Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality, 63, as well as Grant’s “Can a Libertarian
Hold that our Free Acts are Caused by God?,” 35–36. And more should be said, we think.
According to Grant’s model, God’s act and the creatures act are logically necessary and sufficient concurrent conditions for each other. See the second-to-last full paragraph on p. 63 of
Grant’s Free Will and God’s Universal Causality.
17
In, e.g., Free Will and God’s Universal Causality (pp. 71, 99–144), Grant makes it clear
that he believes that his Dual Sources account is intended to include not merely free human
actions in the libertarian sense but free actions of this kind that are morally significant (i.e.,
actions that render those who perform them the appropriate subject of moral praise or
blame).
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If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of
nature and events in the remote past. But we are not responsible for whatwent on before we were born, and neither are we responsible for what the
laws of nature are. Therefore, we are not responsible for the consequences of
these things (including our present acts).18

The direct argument is highly significant. If it is successful, we have an
argument for incompatibilism about responsibility and causal determinism that does not make use of two controversial claims typically invoked
by incompatibilists: (i) a person is morally responsible for what she has
done only if she could have done otherwise, and (ii) if the person’s action
is causally determined, then she could not have done otherwise. Since
compatibilists (i.e., those that believe that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism) typically deny one or the other of these
claims, the direct argument offers an intriguing way to argue for incompatibilism about responsibility and determinism that sidesteps many of
the traditional battlegrounds between compatibilists and incompatibilists.
The direct argument rests on two rules of inference. These rules are as
follows (where, “☐” stands for broadly logical necessity;19 “⊃” stands for
material implication; and “NRp” stands for “p and no mere human is now
or ever has been even partly morally responsible for p”):
Rule A: From ☐p, we may infer NRp
Rule B: From NRp and NR(p ⊃ q), we may infer NRq

Rules A and B are meant to be fairly straight forward rules of inference.
Rule A, for example, says that no mere human is now or ever has been
even partly morally responsible for a necessary truth. Here is a candidate
example: it is a necessary truth that triangles are enclosed geometric planes
consisting of three angles (no more, no less) that add up to 180 degrees (no
more, no less). But, it is obvious that no mere human is now or ever has
been even partly morally responsible for this fact, and this is just what
Rule A says. Following van Inwagen, this rule seems to us “to be beyond
dispute.”20
18
An Essay on Free Will, 16. To be clear, what we have written, here, is van Inwagen’s
“consequence argument” cashed out in terms having to do with “responsibility.” Where
the consequence argument speaks in terms of the past and the laws of nature and whether
or not they are “up to” anyone, the direct argument speaks in terms of the past and the
laws of nature and whether or not anyone is “morally responsible” for them. This distinction is important because Leigh Vicens (“Divine Determinism, Human Freedom, and the
Consequence Argument”) has recently criticized non-competitivist views of divine and
human agency making use of the consequence argument. We believe the direct argument is
open to fewer objections; so, we believe the tack we are taking, via the direct argument, is a
stronger opponent for Grant, and the non-competitivist more generally.
19
Roughly, to say that P is broadly logically necessary is to say that not-P entails a
contradiction.
20
Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, 184. Here, van Inwagen includes the following
examples of necessary truths for which no mere human is now, or ever has been, responsible:
“No one is responsible for the fact that 49 x 18 = 882, for the fact that arithmetic is essentially
incomplete, or, if Kripke is right about necessary truth, for the fact that the atomic number
of gold is 79.”

Faith and Philosophy

320

Rule B says that if no mere human is now or ever has been even partly
morally responsible for some fact, p, nor for the fact that p materially
implies some other fact, q, then it may be inferred that no mere human
is now or ever has been even partly morally responsible for q. This rule
is more controversial than the former. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to
maintain that the validity of Rule B can be demonstrated. For, consider
the following:
From the fact that no mere human is now or ever has been partly morally
responsible for the fact that Plato died in antiquity, and no mere human is
now or ever has been even partly morally responsible for the fact that Plato’s
having died in antiquity logically implies that Plato never met [David]
Hume, we may infer that no mere human is now or ever has been even
partly morally responsible for the fact that Plato never met Hume.21

Both of these rules, then, seem quite plausible. In any case, since one of the
present authors has defended them elsewhere in detail, we assume their
validity here.22
Now, to illustrate the direct argument, consider an individual (i.e.,
a mere human) named Chachi, who decides to steal a bottle of expensive gin from his sweet grandmother on his fifteenth birthday. With van
Inwagen’s Rules A and B in hand, plus two very plausible premises, one
can show that if Chachi’s decision to steal is causally determined, then
it’s not something for which he can be morally responsible. Here are the
details of but one application of van Inwagen's argument. Assume, for
conditional proof, that causal determinism is true. From this assumption,
we can reason as follows (where “C” stands for Chachi’s decision to steal
gin from his grandmother on his fifteenth birthday; “P” labels a complete
description of the world prior to the existence of any human person; and
“L” stands for a conjunction of the laws of nature; and, as before, where,
“☐” stands for broadly logical necessity; “⊃” stands for material implication; and “NRp” stands for “p and no mere human is now or ever has been
even partly morally responsible for p”):
(1) ☐ (P & L ⊃ C)
(2) ☐ (P ⊃ (L ⊃ C))
(3) NR (P ⊃ (L ⊃ C))
(4) NR P
(5) NR (L ⊃ C)
(6) NR L
(7) NR C

21

(By definition of “determinism”)23
(1, and exportation)
(2, and Rule A)
(Premise)
(From 3, 4, and Rule B)
(Premise)
(From 5, 6, and Rule B)

Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, 187.
See the following: Turner, “Truth and Moral Responsibility”; Turner, “Shabo on Logical
Versions of the Direct Argument”; and Turner and Capes, “Rule A.”
23
Some might wish to quibble with this definition of determinism. But, here, we’re simply
following the view that is most common in the philosophical literature on free will. In particular, we are using the definition that Peter van Inwagen uses in his An Essay on Free Will
(see, especially, 185).
22
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Put simply, if Chachi’s decision to steal gin in the relevant circumstance
is causally determined, then the past and the laws of nature jointly entail
Chachi’s decision at that time. But since Chachi is not morally responsible
for the past prior to the existence of any human person and since he is not
morally responsible for the laws of nature, then—with Rules A and B in
hand—we can conclude that he is not morally responsible for his present
decision to steal the gin.
With this in the backdrop, we now argue that there is a theological version of the direct argument in the offing that undermines Grant’s extrinsic
model of non-competitivism, the Dual Sources account. More specifically,
we consider a formulation of this theological argument, which builds
on the details of Grant’s extrinsic model of divine action, for the purpose of showing that DUC is incompatible with (mere) human moral
responsibility.
The Theological Direct Argument
Recall that Grant’s non-competitivist view rests on the what he calls the
“extrinsic model” of divine causal agency. That model, you will remember, includes the following ingredients of divine causation:
(a) God.
(b) E.
(d) God’s reason for causing E.
(e) The causal-dependence relation between God and E.
(f) God’s causal act, or causing of E, which consists in E plus the causal relation between God and E.
(g) God’s willing or choosing E, which is nothing else than God’s causing E
for a reason when God could have done otherwise.

Allegedly, none of these infringe upon a human’s moral responsibility for
her performing some action (in the cases where “E” denotes the occurrence
of some human action) for the reasons discussed in Section II. Against
Grant, we argue that there is a theological version of the direct argument
that shows that the extrinsic model of divine causation does infringe upon
a human’s moral responsibility for performing an action.
Here, then, is a theological version of the direct argument, spelled out
in terms of Grant’s extrinsic model of divine causal agency.
If the extrinsic model of divine causation is true, and God causes all our
actions, then all our acts are the consequences of the truth of God’s existence, God’s reasons for causing our actions, the causal-dependence relation between God and our actions, God’s causal act, and God’s willing or
choosing our actions. But we are neither responsible for the fact that God
exists, for God’s reasons for causing our actions, the causal-dependence relation between God and our actions, God’s causal act, nor God’s willing or

322

Faith and Philosophy

choosing our actions. Therefore, we are not responsible for the consequences
of these things, including our present acts.

In short, the facts of Grant’s extrinsic model, when paired with DUC,
preclude (mere) humans from being moral responsible for any of their
actions.
It will prove helpful to state the theological version of the direct more
formally. In order to do so, let GCA refer to the conjunction of (a), (d), (e),
(f), and (g) from Grant’s extrinsic model. Also, let (b) remain as it is above,
i.e., some creaturely effect, E, specifically some intentional human action.
Once again, let “☐” stand for broadly logical necessity, “⊃” stand for material implication, and “NR” stand for “no mere human is now or ever has
been even partly morally responsible for that which is referred to by NR.”
With these designations in mind, consider the following formulation of
the argument.
(1) ☐ (GCA ⊃ (b))
(2) NR (GCA ⊃ (b))
(3) NR GCA
(4) NR (b)

(By definition of the extrinsic model of divine causation)
(1, Rule A)
(Premise)
(2, 3, Rule B)

Premise 1 says that, necessarily, if the conjunction of (a), (d), (e), (f), and
(g) (from Grant’s extrinsic model) is true, then (b) is true. Premise 2 is an
application of Rule A to 1. It says that no mere human is now or ever has
been even partily morally responsible the fact that GCA (i.e., the conjuction of (a), (d), (e), (f), and (g)) materially implies (b). This is because 2
refers to that which is broadly logically necessary, and Rule A states that
no mere human can, in any way or at any time, be morally responisible
for such necessary truths. Premise 3 indicates that no mere human is now
or ever has been even partly morally responsible for the fact that the conjunction of (a), (d), (e), (f), and (g) is true. Finally, 4 ultilizes Rule B and the
other premises of the argument to conclude that no mere human is now or
ever has been even partily morally responsible for any creaturely effect, or
action, that is caused by God in the manner proposed by Grant.
The theological version of the direct argument is clearly valid. So, if
Grant (or any non-competitivist, generally) wants to dismiss the argument, he’ll have to show which of the above premises is false. If none of
the premises are false, it follows that the argument is sound, and Grant’s
extrinsic model of divine causal activity fails as an account of non-competitivism about divine and human agency. Since 1 and 2 are beyond
reproach, the only place to press on this argument is at premise 3, at least
once Rules A and B are assumed.24 But 3 appears to be more plausible than
its denial, specifically given the traditional conception of God upheld by
Grant. It just does not seem to be the case, in other words, that any mere
24
We concede that one could question the argument’s inference rules (Rules A and B),
and so question premises that rely on those inference rules. But, as noted, we are taking it
for granted that these rules are valid, given that one of us has defended each of these rules
(successfully, we believe) in various places. See n. 22.

GRANT ON HUMAN FREE WILL, AND DIVINE UNIVERSAL CAUSATION 323

human is now or ever has been even partially morally responsible for GCA
or the items that comprise it (i.e., the fact that God exists, for God’s reasons
for causing the relevant mere human’s action, for the causal-dependence
relation between God and this mere human’s action, for God’s causal act,
or for God’s willing or choosing this human action). The plausibility of 3
is perhaps best seen after objections to it are considered.
IV. Objections to Premise 3 of the Theological Direct Argument
The First Objection to 3
One such objection might go like this:
While all should agree that no mere human is morally responsible for most
of the conjuncts that make up GCA, it’s at least plausible that some mere
human could be responsible for the fact that there is a causal-dependence
relation between God and some human action; for, if the human hadn’t acted
as she did, then there wouldn’t be the relevant relation. And, since GCA
wouldn’t be true if there weren’t the relevant causal-dependence relation, if
a mere human is morally responsible for the relevant relation, then it seems
as if a mere human could be at least partly morally responsible for GCA.
Thus, premise 3 is false.

This is an objection to premise 3 which Grant anticipates in basic form and
in effect endorses.25 Nevertheless, we think it fails.
To see why we think this objection fails, consider Chachi, again. Suppose
that God provides conditions in which Chachi deliberates about whether
or not to steal his grandmother’s gin on his fifteenth birthday. Suppose,
further, that Chachi decides to steal the gin in such a way that renders
him morally blameworthy for his thievery. While we agree that Chachi
would be morally responsible for the occurrence of the event associated
with his action, we deny that he would be similarly responsible for the fact
that there is the relevant causal-dependence relation between God and the
event (i.e., (e)). For, we think that such reasoning relies on the following
invalid rule of inference:
INVALID: If S is responsible for p, and p implies q, then S is responsible
for q.

Here is why we maintain that the imagined objection rests on INVALID.
The claim seems to be this: Chachi is morally responsible for stealing the
gin; but, Chachi’s thievery implies, given Grant’s theological causal picture, that there is the relevant causal-dependence relation between God
and Chachi’s thievery (it is both necessary and sufficient for the existence
of the relevant causal relation); so, since Chachi is morally responsible for
the fact that he steals his grandmother’s gin, it follows, given Grant’s Dual
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E.g., Grant, “Can a Libertarian Hold that our Free Acts are Caused by God?,” 34–35, 43.
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Sources account, that Chachi is similarly responsible for the fact that there
is the relevant causal-dependence relation.
But, INVALID is invalid. To see why, consider the following. We are (we
might assume) morally responsible for the fact that we are considering
Grant’s Dual Sources account of DUC. But, this fact implies that there is
or was such a person as W. Matthews Grant. However, even though we
are (we might assume) morally responsible for the former, we are not similarly responsible for the latter. But, INVALID says we are; so, INVALID is
invalid. Moreover, any objection that relies on INVALID rests on an invalid inference principle. We argue that the stated objection to premise 3 of
our theological version of the direct argument relies on INVALID; so, we
conclude that the stated objection rests on an invalid rule of inference.
Thus, we conclude that the objection fails.
The Second Objection to 3
Now, in reply, Grant might say something like the following:
Just a minute. While I agree that INVALID is invalid, my objection to premise 3 does not rely on that principle. For, my claim isn’t that a mere human
could be morally responsible for the relevant causal-dependence relation
between God and human actions because the action is sufficient for the existence of the causal-dependence relation (as the previous objection apparently
assumes); rather, it’s because the action is necessary for the relevant causal-dependence relation. Again, premise 3 is false.26

But this objection fails, too. To see why it fails, consider Chachi yet again.
Suppose that we agree that Chachi is morally responsible for stealing his
grandmother’s gin on his fifteenth birthday, and his having stolen the
gin on this occasion is a necessary condition for the relevant causal-dependence relation between God and Chachi’s thievery. All the same, we
deny that Chachi is in any way morally responsible for the existence of
the relevant relation (i.e., (e)). For, though it is true that there would be no
causal-dependence relation between God and Chachi’s act of thievery if
Chachi had not stolen, whether or not there is a causal-dependence relation
between God and Chachi’s having stolen the gin seems to be something
only for which God can be responsible (whether moral or some other kind
of responsibility). At most Chachi is morally responsible for his thievery, and the causal-dependence relation between he and his having stolen the gin on this occassion. Chachi is not, on the other hand, similarly
responsible for there being a causal-dependence relation between God and
Chachi’s having stolen the gin—i.e., the relation of God having caused
Chachi to steal the gin. It seems only God can be (morally or otherwise)
responsible for that.
Think of it like this. Suppose that our writing this paper causes Paul,
Grant’s friend and fellow defender of the Dual Sources account, to write
26
Once again, see Grant’s “Can a Libertarian Hold that our Free Acts are Caused by
God?,” 34–35, 43.
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a reply piece. Should we think that Paul’s writing a reply confers on him
some responsibility (moral or otherwise) for the fact that we caused him
to reply? Even if we grant that Paul would be morally responsible for his
having replied, it seems to us implausible that Paul could be similarly
responsible for our having caused him to reply; that is, for the causal-dependence relation that exists between our having written this paper, and
Paul’s having replied. So, we conclude that this second objection to 3 fails.
Before moving to another objection to 3, it’s worth mentioning that the
notion that only God can be (in some sense) responsible for the relevant
causal-dependence relation is strengthened when viewed in light of the
broadly Thomistic vision of God in which Grant’s Dual Sources account
is couched. On this broadly Thomistic picture, God is absolutely simple
(i.e., “that God lacks composition of any sort and that there are no entities
intrinsic to, but distinct from, God”),27 bears no real relations to creation
(i.e., “For any relation God has to creatures, there is no real foundation
in God for that relation,” and hence, when conjoined with DUC, “God’s
causing or bringing about some effect within creation will not involve any
real or instinsic state or property of God that would not be there were
he not causing that effect”),28 and presumably is impassible (i.e., not subject to external causes). However, it seems to us impossible that God could
be caused to do anything by any mere human on such a vision. We take
this to be a good indicator, furthermore, that no mere human could be, in
any way, morally responsible for the relevant causal-dependence relation
between God and her action (which, on Grant’s extrinsic model, is a component of God’s causal act) just because she is morally responsible for that
which is necessary for the relevant causal-dependence relation.
The Third Objection to 3
Here is another objection to consider:
Perhaps it’s true that a mere human can’t be morally responsible for the
relevant causal-dependence relation between God and this human action
even if the action is sufficient for the existence of the cause-effect relation;
and, perhaps it’s true that a mere human can’t be morally responsible for the
relevant causal-dependence relation between God and the human’s action
even if the action is necessary for the relevant causal-dependence relation.
The real worry is whether or not a human can be morally responsible for the
relevant causal-dependence relation between God and the human’s action
when the action is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of the relevant causal-dependence relation. But, plausibly, the mere human can be so
responsible. Again, it seems that premise 3 is false.

Unsurpringly, we, yet again, believe the objection fails. We think this third
objection to 3 fails because it relies on the following rule of inference:

27
28

Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality, 56.
Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality, 57.
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BC: If S is morally responsible for p, and p iff q, then S is morally responsible
for q.

But, we claim that any objection that rests on BC is subject to counterexample; so, it will fail. Consider the following case. Suppose that Al is
morally responsible for the existence of the philosophy department at the
University of Our Lady; he believed that such a department is a great
good, and so he campaigned to get it established. Obviously, that there is
a philosophy department at the University of Our Lady implies that there
is such a place as the University of Our Lady. But, all should agree that
this fact alone does not render Al morally responsible for there being such
a place as the University of Our Lady (as we’ve shown with the INVALID
case, above). But, suppose, further, that, unbeknownst to Al, the university’s Board of Trustees have decreed that the university’s continued
existence depends on the existence of the philosophy department; no philosophy deparment, no university. Should we conclude that because Al is
morally responsible for the existence of the philosophy department, and
that the existence of the philosophy department is a necessary condition
for the existence of the university, that Al is, thereby, morally responsible
for the existence of the University of Our Lady? We think not. For one
thing, Al isn’t even aware that the university’s existence depends on the
existence of the philosophy department. For another, it’s not up to him
that the existence of the philosophy department is the ad hoc necessary
condition for the existence of the university.
To see that we’re right about this, suppose that Al is the only philosopher at the university. And suppose that Al retires. Well, with him goes
the department and the university. Given the story so far, should anyone
really think it appropriate to saddle Al with moral blame for the folding
of the university (supposing it to be a moral issue)? It stretches credulity
to think that this sort of moral appraisal would be appropriate. But, BC
implies that it would be. So, BC is false, and the objection resting on BC
fails.
The Fourth Objection to 3
Our defense of 3 has so far been focused on GCA’s (e). Specifically, we
have been responding to the notion that some mere human might be
morally responsible for the causal-dependence relation that transpires in
virtue of God causing this human’s action in the manner that GCA indicates. However, Grant might concede that no mere human can be morally
responsible for (e) yet insist that such a human could be partly morally
responsible for GCA’s (d), that is, for God’s reason for causing the relevant
human action. In light of this consideration, the following fourth objection
to 3 might be offered:
While all should agree that no mere human is morally responsible for most
of the conjuncts that make up GCA, it’s at least plausible that some mere
human could be responsible for the fact that God has reasons for causing a
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human to act as she does; for, we might suppose that God’s primary reasons
for causing a human to act as she does is based on God’s foreknowledge (or
middle knowledge) that said human will (or would) act as she does. And,
since GCA wouldn’t be true if God didn’t have the relevant reasons, if a
mere human is morally responsible for the relevant reasons, then it seems as
if a mere human could be at least partly morally responsible for GCA. Thus,
premise 3 is false.

But, we think that this objection fails as well. Suppose that God knows
that Chachi will steal his grandmother’s gin on his fifteenth birthday, and
this provides the reason why God chooses to cause Chachi’s act of thievery. Suppose, also, that Chachi is morally responsible for the fact that God
knows, in advance, what Chachi will do. Even supposing these things,
we deny that Chachi could credibly be burdened with any sort of moral
responsibility for the fact that God’s having foreseen what Chachi would
do provides God with reasons for causing Chachi to do what he does.
Whether and to what extent God has reasons to cause an agent to act as
she does seems to be up to God and God alone—or, perhaps, God plus
certain necessarily true moral principles. Hence, in our view, the objection
misses the mark.
Here is a way to think about it. Suppose that Chachi’s father, Joe, has
decided to give Chachi a new car for his birthday. But, also suppose that
he has decided that if Chachi steals his grandmother’s gin, then this will
be a sufficient reason not to give Chachi the new car. Chachi steals the gin.
Should we conclude that Chachi is morally responsible for providing Joe
with the reason not to give Chachi a new car? It’s difficult to see how this
could be so. For, it’s not up to Chachi that his stealing of the gin is the reason his father won’t give him a car for his birthday. That decision—what
will count as the reason for Joe’s deciding not to give Chachi the car—is
up to Joe, not Chachi. And we think the same logic applies to God and
Chachi (and any mere human whomever). Thus, we conclude that Chachi
is not responsible for providing God with reasons to cause him to steal his
grandmother’s gin.
That said, we concede that our response to the objection at issue might
be mistaken. So, before moving on, let us suppose, for the moment, that a
mere human (Chachi, say) could be morally responsible for God’s reasons
for causing some human action (like Chachi’s stealing the gin). Even if
this were true, it is still far from obvious that being responsible for God’s
reasons for causing some human action would imply (even partial) moral
responsibility for GCA. While we acknowledge that in at least some cases
it seems clear that one could be responsible for the truth of a conjunction
just by virtue of being responsible for the truth of one of its conjuncts, it is
not at all clear to us that this is always the case. For example, suppose it is
true that James robs the bank and Lars robs the bank (where the same bank is
in view). It seems perfectly plausible that James is at least partially morally responsible for this conjunctive fact just by virtue of the fact that he
is morally responsible for the fact that James robs the bank. The same can be
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said for Lars and the conjunct associated with him. By contrast suppose
that the following are true:
5. James plays the guitar,
6. Hitler causes the Holocaust, and
7. Hitler invades Poland.

Now, call the conjunction of 5 – 7, WW2. While we may assume that James
is morally responsible for 5, we deny that James is in any way morally
responsible for WW2. And cases like this abound. For example, to WW2,
add the following:
8. The present authors write this paper,

and call this new conjunction WW2*. Again, while we grant (for present
purposes) that we are morally responsible for writing this paper, we deny
that we are in any way morally responsible for WW2*. And so on.
The point is this: we agree that there are some cases (maybe many cases)
where a person could be morally responsible for a conjunctive fact just by
virtue of being responsible for one of its conjuncts. But, we deny that this
is true in every case (indeed it is not true in many cases, as above). So, what
we would need is a reason to think that Chachi (say) is morally responsible for GCA even if we concede that he is morally responsible for one of
GCA’s conjuncts. We need a reason to think, in other words, that GCA is
like the conjunctive fact that James robs the bank and Lars robs the bank, and
not like the conjunctive facts, WW2 and WW2*. Without a good argument
for this, we feel free to reject it.
Moreover, here is at least one bit of motivation for thinking that GCA
is relevantly similar to WW2 (and WW2*). We think it utterly implausible
that James could be held morally responsible for WW2 just by virtue of his
being morally responsible for the fact that he plays the guitar because we
find it utterly implausible that James satisfies the relevant epistemic conditions for being morally responsible for a fact like WW2. For, arguably, an
individual can be morally responsible for some state of affairs only if that
individual can be expected to believe (or, minimally, sense) that this state
of affairs is morally significant (i.e., morally good or bad, etc.) and her performance of a specific action might contribute to the instantiation of that
state of affairs, or some morally relevant approximation thereto. Call this
“the awareness condition.” Applied to James and his playing of his guitar,
the awareness condition implies that James can be morally responsible for
WW2 only if James can be expected to believe (or sense) that WW2 is morally significant and that his playing of his guitar might contribute to the
instantiation of WW2, or some morally relevant approximation thereto.
But, we stipulate, James lacks the required sort of awareness for responsibility for a conjunctive fact like WW2.29 Hence, given the awareness condition, James is not morally responsible for WW2.
29

For more on the epistemic conditions of moral responsibility, see, e.g., Mele, “Moral
Responsibility for Actions,” and Levy, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, or the very
helpful entry at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and its extensive bibliography.
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Return, then, to GCA and the situation in which Chachi steals the gin.
If Chachi is relevantly like the overwhelming majority of humans, he has
never even considered (or sensed) the notion that his performance of this
specific action might bring about anything like reasons for God causing
that action by Chachi. Nor has Chachi even thought to ponder the moral
significance of his performance of an action possibly providing God with
reasons for causing that action, let alone that GCA is morally significant
and that his performace of an action might contribute to anything like
GCA. In short, Chachi fails to satify the awareness condition. But if this is
so, then Chachi cannot be morally responsible for GCA.
Importantly, what is true for Chachi in the described situation is likely
true for nearly every human who has not had the pleasure of reading
Grant’s work. So, given the awareness condition, it follows, at the very
least, that the overwhelming majority of humans are simply not epistemically situated to be morally responsible for a conjuctive state of affairs
such as GCA.
Notice, moreover, that the mere fact that one is acquainted with and
convinced by Grant’s Dual Sources account, and perhaps thereby fulfills
the awareness condition, hardly renders one potentially morally responsible for her acts that fall under GCA. For, consider 8, above. If we add
8 to WW2, we get WW2*. Surely (since it’s the case that we are writing
this paper, and are aware that 8 is a conjunct of WW2*), we have met the
relevant awareness condition for WW2* (or so we might, if we are secretly
convinced of Grant’s Dual Sources account). Should we conclude, then,
that we are partly morally responsible for WW2*? It seems dubious to
us that we should think so. So, we see that though the awareness condition might be met, it doesn’t for a moment follow that this is sufficient for
moral responsibility.
Here is the upshot. Even if the awareness condition is not quite right,
or even if some human somehow meets the relevant awareness condition,
it does not seem that a mere human can be even partially responsible for
GCA just by providing reasons for God to cause the human to act as she
does. Absent reason to think otherwise, therefore, we conclude that a mere
human cannot be even partly morally responsible for GCA just by being
responsible for (d) (and, to repeat, we doubt that a mere human can be
even partly morally responsible for (d) as well).
The Fifth Objection to 3
We are now in a position to address a final objection to 3.
The treatments of objections to 3 provided so far miss the most obvious candidate for what would, under the right conditions, render a mere human
morally responsible for GCA. Let’s agree that a mere human cannot be even
partly morally responsible for GCA by being partially morally responsible
for God’s reasons for causing an action of hers, or for that which is necessary,
sufficient, or jointly necessary and sufficient for the existence of the relevant
causal-dependence relation between God and her action. Still, it’s plausible
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that a mere human may be partly morally responsible for GCA just by being
partly morally responsible for her action at issue, call it E. This is because
Grant analyzes God’s causing of E in terms of E plus the causal relation
between God and E. Given this analysis, it seems that a mere human can be
partly morally responsible for GCA in virtue of being at least partly morally
responsible for E. Hence, it looks as if premise 3 is mistaken.

By now it should be clear to the reader why we think this objection fails.
As discussed already, even when we agree that E is necessary, sufficient,
or both necessary and sufficient for GCA, a mere human’s being morally responsible for E by itself provides no assurance that she is similarly
responsible for GCA. In addition, it is doubtful that most or all mere
humans fulfill the required awareness condition for being even partly
responsible for GCA just in virtue of being morally responsible for E. So,
until the defender of Grant’s Dual Sources account presents reasons for
thinking otherwise, we conclude that this final objection to 3 doesn’t
appear to be promising.
V. Objections to Rule B within the Theological Version of the Direct Argument
As noted upfront, we are supposing the truth of Rule B for the purposes
of this paper. This is because defenses of this rule exist elsewhere (both in
its original and in modified form), including defenses by one of the present authors. Nevertheless, some of the ways in which we defend 3 of the
theological version of the direct argument might specifically cause one to
doubt Rule B, or else its present application. We therefore now consider
two objections that run along such lines.
The First Objection to Rule B
The first of these objections has to do with the way in which we utilize
our proposed awareness condition. Recall, we claim that the awareness
condition provides one reason to think that very few humans, if any, meet
a necessary (but, we stress, not sufficient) condition for partial moral
responsibility for GCA, even if we grant that some humans might be morally responsible for certain constitutents of GCA. This is because almost no
human is even faintly aware that he or she might be morally responsible
for anything like GCA. But to affirm that few, if any, mere humans meet a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for partial moral responsibility for
GCA, and to affirm with us the seeming implausibility that a mere human
could be responsible for GCA even if she is morally responsible for some
constituents of GCA (e.g., providing God with reasons to cause her to act
as she does), is essentially to affirm 3, the central premise of our central
argument. However, one might contend that the awareness condition has
untoward implications when paired with Rule B.
To see why one might think this, consider the following two claims, p
and q:
(p) James murders Fred, and Fermat’s Last Theorem is true
(q) James murders Fred
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Given the awareness condition from above, we get NRp (i.e., no mere
human is even partly responsible for that which is found in p, above). For,
we may assume, no mere human is aware that p is morally significant and
that her performance of a specific action might contribute to the instantiation of p, or some morally relevant approximation thereto. Moreover,
one might claim that it’s obvious that NR (p ⊃ q). So, from Rule B, we get
NRq, i.e., that no one (not even James) is responsible for the fact that James
murders Fred. And this can’t be right. So, it seems, at least on this line of
thought, that Rule B (which is crucial to our case) combined with a very
plausible awareness condition on moral responsibility leads to an absurd
conclusion, namely that no one, not even James, is responsible for the fact
that James murders Fred.30
But, we deny that this objection is successful. For, though we happily
agree that no one (no mere human, anyway) is even partly morally responsible for the truth of that James murders Fred, and Fermat’s Last Theorem is
true, we deny that no mere human is even partly morally responsible for
the fact that this fact (i.e., p) implies the further fact, that James murders Fred
(i.e., q). The reason for this has to do with our acceptance of the following
principle proposed by one of us (Turner) in earlier work:
Truth DependenceMORAL [TDM]: For all agents, S, and all propositions, p, if S
is directly31 morally responsible for that which p’s truth depends on (in the
sense of “depends on” in which truth depends on the world), then S is at
least partly directly morally responsible for p’s truth.32

Following Trenton Merricks,33 Turner argued that
TDM is a corollary to a “truism about truth”, viz., that “truth depends (in
a very trivial way) on the world.” The idea, here, is very simple. For example, it’s true that dogs bark because dogs bark; it’s true that the earth revolves
around the sun because the earth revolves around the sun; and so on [. . .].
The idea, here, is that when a person is morally responsible for the truth of
some proposition—that Jones kills Smith, say—she’s responsible for the truth
of the proposition just because the truth of the proposition depends on what
she does. Conversely, if a person isn’t morally responsible for the truth of
some proposition, it’s because she’s not responsible for the thing the truth of
the proposition depends on (e.g., Jones isn’t responsible for the truth of that
Jones kills Smith because she didn’t kill Smith).34
30

Thanks to an anonymous referee for this objection.
By “directly” we mean something like this. If Jones shoots Smith, then (supposing
that Jones meets all the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral responsibility) Jones
is directly morally responsible for having shot Smith. Juxtapose this with this example:
suppose that Jones shoots Smith with a Smith & Wesson. While Jones is directly morally
responsible for having shot Smith, one might also think that Smith & Wesson bear some
responsibility, too. We’re not sure about that. But, even if it’s true that Smith & Wesson do
bear some responsibility, it surely isn’t direct moral responsibility. At best, it seems to us, they
bear an indirect sort of moral responsibility.
32
See Turner, “Truth and Moral Responsibility,” 214–230, and Turner, “Shabo on Logical
Versions of the Direct Argument,” 2129.
33
Merricks, Truth and Ontology; and his “Truth and Freedom.”
34
Turner, “Shabo on Logical Versions of the Direct Argument,” 2129.
31
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If TDM is true, then Rule B does not have the unfortunate entailment that
no mere human is even partly morally responsible for the fact that James
murders Fred, even when this rule is paired with the awareness condition.
Here is why. If TDM is true, then it follows that James is responsible
for the fact that p ⊃ q because he’s responsible for q. For, given how logic
works, where p is true, the truth of p ⊃ q depends trivially on the truth of
q. (Notice: the logical equivalent of p ⊃ q is ~p v q. So, where p is true, ~p
is false; thus, ~p v q is true iff q is true.)
Nevertheless, one might wonder whether James could be said to meet
the relevant awareness condition with respect to the conditional in question. We believe he can. For, given the truth of p (for any true p whatever),
the truth of p ⊃ q depends trivially on the truth of q. That is to say, the truth
of James murders Fred, and Fermat’s Last Theorem is true (i.e., p) depends trivially upon the first of these components (namely, q). And, if James is at all
acquainted with elementary logic (or simply every day, commonsensical
inferences), he’ll have met the relevant awareness condition with respect
to the conditional in question. So, we conclude that neither Rule B nor the
relevant awareness condition have been rendered problematic for the case
we are making against Grant’s Dual Sources account.
The Second Objection to Rule B
Part of our case against Grant’s Dual Sources account is that no mere
human is even partly morally responsible for either GCA or for the fact
that GCA materially implies a specific human action. From this, via Rule
B, we conclude that no mere human is even partly morally responsible
for said human action. One way to resist this conclusion is by presenting
a parody case in which similar forms of inference lead to an apparently
mistaken outcome.
Consider the following case of this kind:35
Suppose that Peter, a chocolate enthusiast, has promised his wife that he
will not eat any chocolate during Lent. Prior to this time, however, Peter
developed the unfortunate habit of gorging himself on chocolate, a habit for
which he is morally responsible. One result of this habit (which Peter foresaw as a plausible and morally relevant outcome) is that the mere offer of
chocolate to Peter now, in many circumstances, causes Peter to eat the chocolate. With this in place, suppose that Stan, knowing nothing of Peter’s promise to his wife nor the nature and results of his chocolate eating habits, offers
Peter a Snickers during Lent in one of those circumstances that causes Peter
35
We owe this second objection to an anonymous referee. We note, here, that this is a fairly
typical sort of objection to Rule B one might find in the literature. We said we weren’t going
to deal with these objections in this paper because we are presupposing the truth of the Rule.
Even so, we’ll, here, briefly consider this objection and this will flag what we believe to be the
best defense of the Rule in the literature. Moreover, there are subtly different versions of Rule
B that exist in the literature, but that are consistent with our theological version of the direct
argument. For example, there is Justin Capes’s Transfer NR* which is designed precisely
to avoid worries of the kind we address here. See his “Incompatibilism and the Transfer of
Non-responsibility.”
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to eat chocolate. Thus, the statement that Stan caused Peter to eat the chocolate
is true. Plausibly, Peter is morally responisible for his chocolate consumption in this scenario and the statement derived therefrom. Also plausible is
the notion that Peter’s having eaten the chocolate is a necessary condition
for the relevant causal-dependence relation between Stan and Peter’s eating
the chocolate. Still, we might wish to deny that Peter is in any way morally
responsible for the existence of the relation of Stan causing Peter to eat the
chocolate. For, as essentially noted in response to the second objection to 3,
though it is true that there would be no causal-dependence relation between
Stan and Peter’s having eaten the chocolate if Peter had not eaten the chocolate, whether or not there is a causal-dependence relation between Stan and
Peter’s having eaten the chocolate seems to be something only for which
Stan can be morally responsible. At most Peter is morally responsible for his
eating the chocolate, and the causal-dependence relation between he and his
eating the chocolate. Peter is not, on the other hand, similarly responsible
for there being a causal-dependence relation between Stan and Peter’s having eaten the chocolate—it seems only Stan can be responsible for that. But,
given Rule B, if we suppose that no mere human (neither Stan nor Peter nor
anyone else) is morally responsible for Stan causing Peter to eat chocolate,
the apparent implication is that Peter isn’t responisible for his chocolate consumption either. That seems wrong, however. So there must be something
mistaken about Rule B, 3, or the manner in which Rule B is being used in the
theological version of the direct argument.

In this parody case, one might think that the validity of Rule B not only
shows that Peter isn’t responsible for the causal-dependence relation
between Stan’s having caused Peter to eat the chocolate, but also for his
having eaten the chocolate at all. The latter implication is implausible,
however.
At the risk of overexplanation, here’s the thought behind the parody
case in the context of our argument against Grant. The imagined objector
might claim that given Rule B, if Peter isn’t responsible for the relevant
causal-dependence relation, and he isn’t responsible for the fact that this
relation implies that he eats the chocolate, then Peter isn’t responsible for
having eaten the chocolate either. And this seems an untoward conclusion.
Thus, one might object, there must be something off about the manner in
which we are defending the theological version of the direct argument.
But, we think this objection fails. This is because we deny that Peter
would lack moral responsibility for the fact that, in the parody account,
the relevant causal-dependence relation implies that he eats the chocolate. We believe that Peter is morally responsible for this fact; and that’s
because we affirm the aforementioned TDM. Armed with this principle,
our thinking goes like this. Suppose that Peter is morally responsible for
his having eaten the chocolate, and call this Q. If we call the relevant causal-dependence relation that exists between Stan and his having caused
Peter to eat the chocolate “P,” we get the fact that P ⊃ Q. And given TDM,
we can see that Peter is responsible for the fact that P ⊃ Q. For, P ⊃ Q is
logically equivalent to ~P v Q. But, given that P is true, the reason that ~P
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v Q is true is because Q is true. That is, the truth of ~P v Q depends on (in
the trivial way that truth depends on the world) Q’s being true. But, Peter
is responsible for Q. So, we conclude that Peter is responsible for the fact
that P ⊃ Q is true. But, the imagined objection needs this to be false; so, we
conclude that this objection (and those based upon similar parody cases)
fails.
Summary and Implications
We think, then, that our formulation of the theological version of the direct
argument poses problems for Grant’s Dual Sources model. Indeed, if Rules
A and B are valid, we maintain that this argument demonstrates that no mere
human can be morally responsible for any act that God causes in the manner
described by the extrinsic model of divine action. But if this is so, then the
conjuction of the extrinsic model plus DUC entails that no mere human is
morally responsible for any action she performs. The implication, given the
noted Rules, is that Grant’s Dual Sources form of non-competitivism fails.
There is, finally, a more far-reaching point to be made. Given that
Grant’s model is (we think) the best, most nuanced version of non-competitivism, we conclude that the failure of the Dual Sources account generalizes. Thus, we conclude that non-competitivism fails as an apt analysis
of God’s causation of responsible human action.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have endeavored to show that, given the validity of Rules
A and B, W. Matthews Grant’s Dual Sources account of non-competitivism fails. If our argument is successful, then God cannot cause a human
action for which the human is morally responsible. We haven’t argued
for why it is that God’s causing a human action rules out the human’s
being morally responsible for the action; we’ve simply shown that it does,
provided that it is agreed that Rules A and B are valid. Perhaps it does
so because God’s causing a human action rules out the human’s acting
with the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility. We leave that
question unanswered. For now, we believe it is sufficient to show that no
human is morally responsible for an action that God causes. Hence, we
believe our theological version of the direct argument has wide-reaching
implications for any view of divine providence that seeks to include the
traditional thesis that humans are regularly morally responsible for what
they do.36

36
We wish to thank W. Matthews Grant and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. In addition, this article was partially constructed while one of its authors (Wessling) was a Resident Fellow with the John Templeton
Foundation funded Creation Project at the Carl F. H. Henry Center for Theological
Understanding, hosted by Trinity Evangelical Divinity School (TEDS) and directed by
Thomas H. McCall. We are grateful to TEDS, the John Templeton Foundation, and McCall
for providing a forum for the production of this paper.
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